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hile much in Classical Tibetan grammar remains 
insufficiently understood,1 as more literature is carefully 
read, further facts emerge, however incrementally, to 
refine our knowledge. In my own very limited reading, restricted to 
translations of Buddhist literature, I have recently come across a 
phenomenon that has so far passed almost unnoticed, namely the 
construction of verb + na go. Although relatively rare, the 
grammatical morpheme go itself has been remarked. The Wörterbuch 
der tibetischen Schriftsprache tells us (Maurer et al. 2005–: 214, s.v. go3) 
that this go is a “Suffix mit emphatischer Funktion”, suggests 
comparing ko, and states that go is “a topic marker similar to ni”, 
citing a remark of Takeuchi (1985: 139).2 The Wörterbuch (Maurer et 
al. 2005–: 113, s.v. ko2) speaks of the above-mentioned ko itself as a 
“Partikel nach Pronomina und Nomina, mit emphatischer Bedeu-
tung: ‘eben’ ‘gerade’ ‘da’ ‘hier’’’.3 Regarding go, Takeuchi’s original 
                                                            
1 This leaves aside for the moment the fact that at some point we must more 
actively acknowledge the multiplicity of what usually falls, without 
discrimination, under the general umbrella of ‘Classical Tibetan’. I received 
valuable advice and references from (in alphabetical order) Nathan Hill, 
Harunaga Isaacson, Berthe Jansen, Seishi Karashima, Charles Ramble, Akira 
Saitō, Lambert Schmithausen, Johannes Schneider, and Peter Verhagen, all of 
whom I thank, and none of whom are responsible for errors. Proper translations 
of the examples cited below would require careful study of the source texts, 
which I have not undertaken. Therefore, it is virtually certain that refinements in 
the translations will be required.  
2 Explaining such elements is, to be sure, not the main function of the Wörterbuch. 
As Helga Uebach wrote in the first fascicule, p. xiv: “Partikeln im Sinne 
grammatischer Funktionswörter, Partikeln zur Wortbildung u. dgl. finden ohne 
Belegstellenkontext Erwähnung.” 
3 In Btsan lha Ngag dbang tshul khrims 1997: 7, s.v. ko, we read: “ko: ni sgra dang 
mtshungs pa’i phrad cig ste | brda yig blo gsal mgrin rgyan las | ko ni tshig phrad ni 
zhes pa’i brda rnying.” The definition seems to be cited here from a work of the 
Alashan Mongol scholar Ngag dbang bstan dar (1759–ca. 1840), alias Bstan dar 
lha rams pa, his Gangs can gyi brda’ gsar rnying las brtsams pa’i brda’ yig blo gsal 
W 
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statement, offered in discussing a short passage from the Old Tibetan 
Chronicle (PT 1287, l. 208) translated from the Chinese Shiji 史記, reads 
as follows (here and below I transcribe all Tibetan in the so-called 
Wylie system): 
 
As for a clever man (Myi ’dzangs-pa go): This clause has not 
been correctly understood by previous scholars, who have 
understood go to be the stem of the verb go-ba, “to 
understand.” In the present context that is impossible both 
from the point of view of grammar and from that of 
content. Here go must be a variant of the grammatical 
particle ko, a topic marker similar to ni. The entire clause 
thus means “as for a clever man,” which corresponds well 
to the expression found in the Chinese version [夫賢士之處
世也]. One problem which remains is the phonetic identifi-
cation of go and ko. In old Tibetan texts the mixing up of 
the aspirated and unaspirated voiceless stops and 
affricates is very common. While the interchange of 
voiced and voiceless stops is much less common, some 
instances do exist. … Therefore, it is possible that in the 
present instant go and ko have been interchanged. 
 
While it is not my goal here to address the question whether go is 
indeed a variant of ko, or vice-versa (though the more one reads a 
variety of Tibetan texts the more one’s tolerance for spelling variation 
grows), we will see that there are advantages to treating the two 
together, at least provisionally.4 Be that as it may, the function of go in 
which I am here most interested appears not to be—or at least not to 
be entirely—covered by Takeuchi’s discussion or that in the Wörter-
buch, since the specific usage upon which I will focus most of my 
attention is that of verb + na go (which also appears as na ko, suggest-
ing that the two are indeed equivalent, at least to many scribes). 
Whether verb + na go is to be considered a sub-case of the syntax of 
go in general is a question best left to linguists.  
                                                                                                                                           
mgrin rgyan. Leonard van der Kuijp, however, writes to me that he has not found 
the reference to Bstan dar Lha rams pa’s text in Bstan dar lha rams pa’i gsung 'bum, 
ed. Ser gtsug nang bstan dpe rnying ’tshol bsdu phyogs sgrig khang (Lhasa: Bod 
ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang, 2008), 622–679. But van der Kujip further 
informs me of Rnam rgyal tshe ring’s Bod yig brda rnying tshig mdzod (Beijing: 
Krung go’i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang, 2001): 8, where, s.v. ko, we find ni sgra’i 
’jug tshal dang ’dra ba’i phrad cig. 
4 As Charles Ramble suggests to me, it is possible that there are phonological 
reasons for the difference after consonants, such that k follows -d and -s, and g 
follows -g and -n, but both forms appear after na. 
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To begin with the statements above, it is important to note at the 
outset that the central usage discussed below is connected not with 
pronouns or nouns, but with grammatical morphemes, and, as far as 
I see now, is limited to placement following the ‘case particle’ na. 
Another usage sees ko/go following directly after a verb, which 
however is not remarked upon in the Wörterbuch. I say that reference 
to the case of verb + na go is ‘not entirely’ covered since the Wörter-
buch does cite one example of this usage, from the Mahārājakaniṣka-
lekha, discussed below.5  
I begin by introducing the passages that initially drew my 
attention to the construction verb + na go, two examples found in a 
Buddhist treatise, the Viṁśikā of Vasubandhu and its auto-
commentary, which I have recently edited in both Sanskrit and 
Tibetan. In this text one example occurs in verse, another in prose. 
The first reads: 
 
[1] gal te de yi las kyis der || 
’byung ba dag ni ’byung ba dang ||  
de bzhin ’gyur bar ’dod na go ||  
rnam par shes par cis mi ’dod || [6] 
 
This corresponds to the following (my translation is from the San-
skrit): 
 
yadi tatkarmabhis tatra bhūtānāṁ sambhavas tathā | 
iṣyate pariṇāmaś ca kiṁ vijñānasya neṣyate ||  
 
If you accept that gross material elements arise there  
in this fashion through the karmic deeds of those [beings],  
and [you accept their] transformation,  
why do you not accept [the transformation] of cognition? 
 
It is obvious here that gal te … ’dod na go corresponds to the Sanskrit 
yadi … iṣyate.6 The second passage reads (in my numbering XV [H]): 
 
                                                            
5 I should note quite clearly that as a specialist in Indian Buddhist literature I mine 
Tibetan translations of Indic texts, rather than grazing in the fields of pure 
Tibetan. I leave it to my proper Tibetanist colleagues to offer observations on the 
grammar of “real Tibetan.” In addition, I have avoided referring to tantric 
literature, even as translated from Sanskrit, because I do not understand it well 
enough to cite it with confidence. There do appear, however, to be a number of 
probably relevant examples in this corpus. 
6 In the version of the verse embedded in the Tibetan translation of the commen-
tary, we find instead of the verb ’dod rather ’dug; I do not understand this well.  
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[2] gal te mtshan nyid tha dad pa nyid kyis rdzas gzhan kho nar rtog gi 
gzhan du ma yin na go | chu’i skye bo phra mo rnams kyang chen 
po dag dang gzugs mtshungs pas mig gis mi sod par mi ’gyur ro || 
 
This corresponds to the following (my translation of the Sanskrit): 
 
sūkṣmāṇāñ codakajantūnāṁ sthūlaiḥ samānarūpāṇām anīkṣaṇaṁ 
na syāt | yadi la(kṣaṇabhe)dād eva dravyāntaratvaṁ kalpyate , 
nānyathā.  
 
And, if you were to imagine [the two] to have a difference in 
substance purely because of a distinction in characteristic 
feature, not otherwise, microscopic aquatic creatures, having 
forms like macroscopic [creatures], would not be invisible. 
 
What drew my attention to these passages is the grammatical 
function of go, which was unclear to me.7 Most of the examples I 
know of the construction verb + na go are, in fact, in verse. Neverthe-
less, the appearance in the Viṁśikā in prose does prove—as will 
further examples cited below—that go is not to be accounted for as a 
metrical filler or other artifact of the verse form, despite its seeming 
predominance in verse.  
Continuing, then, with our review of previous scholarship, the 
above mentioned passage from the Mahārājakaniṣkalekha (ed. and 
trans. Hahn 1999: 40–41, verse 69), for which we have no extant 
Sanskrit, reads as follows: 
 
[3] sngon chad bgyis pa’i sug las kyis || 
’di ltar ’ben du gyur pa la || 
khyod nyid gnod pa mdzad na go ||  
su la skyabs su mchi ba gsungs || 
 
When even someone in your position harms those 
who have become a target 
because of deeds committed in the past, 
tell me, in whom will they take refuge? 
 
Hahn comments (1999: 234) that go is an “emphatic particle, used 
after pronouns and case particles.” In his translation, however, it 
would appear that Hahn made no effort to express any emphasis 
added to the verbal expression (his “even” seems to represent the 
                                                            
7 When the sub-commentary of Vinītadeva to the Viṁśikā quotes the expression 
from the prose (Derge 4065, sems tsam, shi, 189b1), it does not help in this regard: 
gzhan du ni ma yin na go zhes bya ba la ’dis ni yul tha dad pa la sogs pa ston to.  
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nyid of khyod nyid).  
Although ko has been noted as an emphatic particle (better: 
grammatical morpheme) at least since the grammar of Bacot (1948: 
13), for whom it is a “Particule emphatique du pronom démonstra-
tif,” go has not fared so well. To my knowledge, however, at least one 
earlier scholar has noticed the peculiar usage of go, that being David 
Roy Shackleton Bailey. In his edition and study of the Śatapañcāśatka 
of Mātṛceṭa we find (1951: verse 106): 
 
[4] phan ’dogs bgyid slad pha ma dag ||  
gal te bla mar ’tshal na go || 
khyod ni lhag par phan ’dogs pas ||  
bla ma ñid gyur smos ci ’tshal || 
 
gurutvam upakāritvān mātāpitror yadīṣyate | 
kedānīm astu gurutā tvayy atyantopakāriṇi || 
 
Shackleton Bailey translates (from the Sanskrit): 
 
If father and mother are acknowledged to be venerable 
because they are benefactors, what dignity should then be 
yours whose beneficence has no limit? 
 
Here again gal te … ’tshal na go translates yadīṣyate. In his remarks on 
an earlier occurence of go, after the word kyis in verse 6 of the same 
text, Shackleton Bailey noted (1951: 153, to 6c) that “go (or ko) seems 
to be a particle unknown to dictionaries. Usually, as here, it 
introduces a question: cp. vv. 106, 136, 139 of this poem.” Stanza 106 I 
have just cited above. In 136d we find [5] de la lan go ci zhig lon, 
corresponding to Sanskrit tava kā tasya niṣkṛtiḥ, translated by Shackle-
ton Bailey “how should there be any requital thereof?” In 139d we 
find [6] gzhan go ci zhig mchis lags kye, corresponding, as Shackleton 
Bailey specifically notes (1951: 140n7), to kim anyat karaṇīyaṁ bhavet, 
words which do not appear in this order in the verse. In his note to 
verse 6, Shackleton Bailey went on to refer briefly to a number of 
other examples, which I cite more fully than did he.  
To begin, in the Lalitavistara we find a verse which reads:8 
 
 [7] ’di yi zhal ni mthong mod kyi || 
spyi gtsug ’phags pa bltar mi snang || 
yi ge’i shes rab mthar phyin na || 
                                                            
8 X.8; Foucaux 1847: 114.9–11; Derge Kanjur 95, mdo sde, kha 67a3–4; Hokazono 
1995: 528; my translation from Tibetan. 
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bdag gis ’di go ji ltar bslab || 
 
vaktraṁ cāsya na paśyāmi mūrdhānaṁ tasya naiva ca | 
śikṣayiṣye kathaṁ hy enaṁ lipiprajñāya pāragaṁ || 
 
Although one may see his face,9  
the crown of his head is so noble that it is invisible.  
Given that he has attained ultimate knowledge of scripts,  
how could I instruct [such a one as] this? 
 
Here line d of the Tibetan corresponds to c of the Sanskrit. One could 
argue—although Shackelton Bailey does not—that go is here meant to 
represent hi. If so, however, this is not a widespread phenomenon, 
despite the ubiquity of the Sanskrti particle; the absence of parallel 
examples may thus allow us to conclude with confidence that go is 
not to be equated with hi, or for that matter, with any specific 
Sanskrit term.10  
Shackelton Bailey continued with an example from the Mūla-
sarvastivāda Vinaya, in which we find the following sentence in 
prose: [8] bdag … rang gi bsod nams kyi ’bras bu la gnas pa go ci’i phyir 
sbyin pa dag mi gtang, to which corresponds in the Nagarāva-
lambikāvadāna of the Divyāvadāna: aham … svapuṇyaphale vyavasthitaḥ 
kasmād dānāni na dadāmi.11 Also from the Bhaiṣajyavastu of the same 
Vinaya, we find another verse:12 
 
[9] gal te kun na chu yod na || 
khron pa’i chus ko ci zhig bya || 
’dir ni sred pa’i rtsa bcad nas || 
gang shig yongs su brtsal bar spyod || 
 
If there is water everywhere,  
what need is there for water from a well? 
                                                            
9 Note that the Sanskrit text is negated: one does not see his face.  
10 An additional consideration: in Sanskrit hi evidently links with katham (ji ltar), 
which we might understand as something like ‘how on earth’ (of course not!). 
However, it is not clear that in Tibetan go should be taken as most closely bound 
with ji ltar, rather than with ’di. If go should be attached to ji ltar we might 
understand something like “how could I possibly instruct”. 
11 Derge Kanjur 1, ’dul ba, kha, 164b7; Cowell and Neil 1886: 83.17. 
12 Derge Kanjur 1, ’dul ba, kha, 133b7–134a1; Yao 2013: 101, 254; my translation. This 
example of Shackleton Bailey must have been known to Hahn 1996: 38, who 
quotes the half verse (without any reference), following the statement: “ko und go 
werden gelegentlich auch nach Nomina, nach Kasus- und Gerundialpartikeln in 
leicht verstärkender Funktion … gebraucht, wobei nich selten auf ko bzw. go ein 
Fraggesatz folgt.” The same is cited in the Wörterbuch (Maurer et al. 2005–: 113: 
ko2), with reference to its source in the Kanjur. 
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Having cut off the roots of thirst/desire,13 
for what should one proceed [further] to search? 
 
It is interesting to note that ‘the same’ verse appears elsewhere, 
articulated, however, slightly differently. Indeed, about 100 pages 
earlier in the same Vinaya text we find (Derge Kanjur 1, ’dul ba, kha, 
29a3–4): 
 
[9a] gal te kun na chu yod na || 
khron pa’i chus ni ci zhig bya || 
sred pa'i rtsa ba bcad nas ni || 
su zhig spyod pa tshol bar byed || 
 
Here in place of ko we find ni. This verse is, moreover, found in a 
number of other places, including in the Udānavarga (Zongtse and 
Dietz 1990: XVII.9), where it takes on yet another form:  
 
[9b] ’di ltar kun na chu yod pas ||  
su zhig tshol zhing rgyu byed de || 
khron pa’i chu lta ci zhig dgos ||  
sred pa rtsa nas gcad par gyis || 
 
It might be that the use of lta here corresponds to the hypothesis of 
Hahn (1994: 290) that lta occurs in interrogative sentences, adding “a 
shadow of indefiniteness” to the preceding noun, to which it belongs: 
“something like water from a well.” Much less likely is that we 
should take lta ci as a unit conveying something like: ‘there is no need 
to mention,’ argued against both on grounds of parallelism with 
other versions of the line and in terms of stress, since it is the first 
element of a combination which should take stress, and here we have 
khrón pa’i chú lta cí zhig dgos.  
We should note that there are variants in the Sanskrit versions of 
this verse as well (see Hiraoka 2007: 132–133),14 but in the Udānavarga 
we read (Bernhard 1965): 
 
kiṁ kuryād udapānena yatrāpaḥ sarvato bhavet | 
tṛṣṇāyā mūlam uddhṛtya kasya paryeṣaṇāṁ caret || 
 
Another prose passage cited by Shackleton Bailey appears in the 
                                                            
13 There is an evident pun on *tṛṣṇā; I thank Berthe Jansen for pointing this out to 
me. 
14 The variations are no doubt also in part due to differences in sectarian 
transmissions of the verse (or verse complex); this makes comparison between 
different instances difficult.  
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Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, where [10] ’bar ba ’di lta go ci zhig ces renders kim 
etad ādīptaṁ nāmeti.15 It is possible here too that lta has some indefinite 
meaning, and much less likely that go has been imposed within the 
otherwise bound expression lta ci.  
Finally, Shackleton Bailey refers to a verse in the Lalitavistara 
which, he acknowledges, has—despite his suggestion that go “usual-
ly … introduces a question”—no following question:16 
 
[11] ’di ni mngon par byung bar gyur na go || 
rgyal po’i pho brang ’di kun nyams mi dga’ || 
rgyal po’i rigs rgyud yun ring gnas pa yang || 
rgyal po’i rigs dang rgyud ni chad par ’gyur || 
 
etasya nirgatasyā rājakulaṁ sarvimaṁ nirabhiramyam | 
ucchinnaś ca bhaveyā pārthivavaṁśaś ciranubaddhaḥ  
 
If [the prince, Siddhārtha] were to depart, 
all of this royal house would be distressed. 
The royal lineage, although it has lasted long, 
the family and line of the king would be cut off.  
 
We encounter here again the combination in which we are interested, 
verb + na go. At least one way of reading it here is as a strongly 
undesired circumstance: if—heaven forbid!—[the prince] were 
actually to leave [the palace] ….  
We began with a look at several attempts to categorize ko/go, 
which share the claim that these grammatical morphemes (or this 
grammatical morpheme, if we accept that the two forms are 
realizations of the same underlying form) follow pronouns or nouns, 
case particles, or introduce a question. Examples of such usages can 
certainly be found, for example in the translation of Āryadeva’s 
Catuḥśataka, even examples in which ko both follows a pronoun and 
introduces a question:17 
 
[12] khyod la gus bzhin rtag par ni || 
mo dang lhan cig phrad pa med || 
’di nga’i gzhan gyi ma yin zhes || 
                                                            
15 Derge Kanjur 113, mdo sde, ja 29b7; Kern and Nanjio 1908–1912: 73.10. 
16 XV.20; Foucaux 1847: 178.9–11; Derge Kanjur 95, mdo sde, kha 100b5–6, Lefmann 
1902: 202.7–8; my translation from Tibetan. It is a bit artificial to quote this verse 
cut out of its narrative context, but since my focus here is on na go rather than the 
overall logic or poetics of the Lalitavistara, this seems permissible. 
17 ed. and trans. Lang 1986: III.11, pp. 40 (my trans.); V.23, pp. 62–63. 
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yongs ’dzin ’di ko ci zhig yin ||18 
 
You cannot have sex with a woman constantly, no matter 
how much she admires you. [Still you] say: ‘She is mine; 
she is not someone else’s’—what need is there of this 
possessiveness? 
 
[13] gang la kun tshe sems dbang ni || 
nyid las skye ba yod gyur pa || 
de ko rgyu cis ’jig rten ni || 
kun gyi mnga’ bdag ’gyur ma yin || 
 
Why shouldn’t a certain [bodhisattva], who always is born 
precisely because of his control over mind, become a ruler 
of the entire world? 
 
Two further examples from the same text also connect ko/go with a 
question, although in the second case not directly:19 
 
[14] skye ba dran pa yod pa’i phyir || 
gal te khyod kyi bdag rtag na || 
sngon byas pa yi rma mthong nas || 
khyod kyi lus ko cis mi rtag ||20 
 
If you [claim that] the self is permanent because of the 
memory of [its past] births, why do you [claim that] the 
body is impermanent, having seen a wound previously 
incurred? 
 
[15] mi rtag nyid gar stobs chung der || 
gnas pa stobs chung ma yin na || 
phyi nas de dag nges par go || 
bzlog par ci yis mthong bar ’gyur || 
 
                                                            
18 According to Lang 1986: 40n, CD read ko while NP read go here. The translation 
of Lang 1986: 41 reads: “You cannot have sexual intercourse constantly [day and 
night] in accordance with your fondness [for sensual pleasure]. To say ‘She is 
mine; she is not someone else’s’—what is the use of this possessiveness?” For a 
translation of the commentary see Ueda 1994: 45. I am not sure I have understood 
the verse correctly.  
19 ed. and trans. Lang 1986: X.7, pp. 96 (my trans.); XI.21, pp. 108–109. 
20 According to Lang 1986: 96n, CD read lus ko while NP read bdag go here. Lang 
1986: 97 translates: “If you [claim that] the self is permanent because of the 
memory of [its past] births, [we reply:] How can you [claim that] the body is 
impermanent when you see a scar previously incurred?” 
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In that case when impermanence is instable, if duration 
were stable, how would these two later be seen to reverse 
[their positions]? 
 
The grammatical morpheme ko/go also appears in this text following 
a case particle:21 
 
[16] las ni ’bad pas byed ’gyur zhing || 
byas zin ’bad pa med par ’jig || 
de ltar gyur kyang khyod la go ||22 
las la chags bral ’ga’ yod min || 
 
yatnataḥ kriyate karma kṛtaṁ naśyaty ayatnataḥ | 
virāgo ’sti na te kaścid evaṁ saty api karmaṇi || 
 
Action is undertaken with effort; the result is destroyed 
effortlessly. Even though this is true, you haven’t any 
aversion to action! 
 
In this last case, at least according to the Tibetan it might be better to 
understand: ‘For you there is not the slightest aversion to action.’  
While all of this, then, seems relatively straight-ahead, even if it 
remains unclear just what ko/go contributes in each and every case, 
there is yet more to the story. Akira Saitō’s careful edition and trans-
lation of Buddhapālita’s Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti contains a number of 
examples of ko directly following a verb, ko in this case, according to 
Saitō (1984: xix), being an “ending particle for emphasis.” However, 
there is something very interesting about the uses Saitō has collected 
(see Saitō 1989, 2013), namely, that they seem to be connected with a 
particular formulaic usage with metaphorical expressions. Saitō 
catalogued more than thirty of these, which almost without exception 
have the form bshad pa | ci khyod … ’am | khyod … [verb] ko ||. 
Thanks to the recent publication of fragments of a Sanskrit manu-
script of Buddhapālita’s text, it has been possible to identify the 
Sanskrit underlying this formula, namely: ucyate | kim idaṁ … [verb] 
| yas tvaṁ … [verb]. For Saitō (2013: 1180):  
 
The complex sentence is composed of both principal 
clause and subordinate one. Having a fixed form, i.e., kim 
idaṁ bhavān …, the principal clause is an ironic interroga-
tion directed to the opponent in which the interrogative 
                                                            
21 Ed. and trans. (of Skt.) Lang 1986: VII.12, pp. 72–73. 
22 According to Lang 1986: 72n, CD read ko while NP read go.  
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particle “kim” is used as making a negative answer to be 
expected. The subordinate clause beginning with yas tvam 
… shows the reason for the ironic question as expressed 
by the preceding principal clause. 
 
Be this as it may—and I do not challenge Saitō’s understanding of the 
Sanskrit here—I do not think that this analysis correctly describes 
what is happening in the Tibetan translation. The first example in the 
text for which we have a corresponding Sankrit version comes in the 
commentary to Mūlamadhyamakakārikā II.14, as cited by Saitō:23 
 
[17] smras pa | re zhig ma song ba yod do || bshad pa | ci khyod 
bu ma btsas par ’chi ba’i mya ngan byed dam | khyod song ba 
med par ma song ba la rtog go ||24  
 
āha | kim idaṁ bhavān ajātaputramaraṇāt saṁtapyate | yas 
tvam asati gate agataṁ kalpayasi |  
 
Saitō’s translation from Sanskrit reads (2013: 1173): 
 
[The opponent] objects: First, there exists that which has not 
yet been gone over (agata). 
[Buddhapālita] answers: Are you now suffering from the 
death [of your son] though he has not yet been born 
because you imagine ‘that which has not yet been gone 
over, i.e., traversed’ when there does not exist ‘that which 
has already been gone over’ (gata)? 
 
Saitō’s translation from Tibetan, however, understands the text as 
follows (1984: I.41): 
 
Objection: There certainly exists that which has not yet 
been gone over. 
Answer: Although you have not begotten a son, are you 
distressed about his death? You are imagining that which 
has not yet been gone over, though that which has already 
been gone over does not exist. 
 
I believe that the latter translation—which might benefit from an 
exclamation point at the very end—captures the required sense, at 
least of the Tibetan text. In fact, most of Buddhapālita’s examples are 
                                                            
23 Saitō refers to D tsa 171b5; P tsa 193b2–3. 
24 Saitō 1984: II.41; 2013: 1173–1174. Saitō (1984: xx) has observed that it is likely that 
this go should be ko, but that it is influenced by the preceding rtog.  
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quite colorful and memorable; they are clearly intended as powerful 
rhetorical flourishes, and the final emphasis is an added ironic push 
showing the unreasonableness of the opponent’s position. Although 
many nice examples could be cited, I limit myself to one further 
instance:25 
 
[18] smras pa | phrad pa med kyang sla ste re zhig gcig pa nyid kyi 
snga rol na gzhan du ’gyur ba’i dngos po gang yin pa de ni 
phrad pa po ste re zhig yod do || bshad pa | ci khyod ma ning 
la phrag dog za ’am | khyod phrad pa med par phrad pa po yod 
pa nyid du ’dod ko ||  
 
Objection: Even if those which have already combined do 
not exist, it does not matter. Those things which have been 
different before they become identical are “combiners”, 
and they certainly exist. 
Answer: Do you envy an eunuch? Although there is no 
combination, you regard a combiner as existent. 
 
Saitō’s translation choses one aspect of the vocabulary here, the 
philosophical, although he obviously also understood that the text is 
being more than a bit sarcastic. The reference to ‘combination’ is to be 
understood in the example (also) as sexual combination, playing on 
the wide semantic range of *saṁyoga. Buddhapālita is saying to the 
opponent: A eunuch can’t have sex, but you maintain that there is 
someone having sex without having sex! The point grammatically 
stressed here, and in all of Buddhapālita’s examples, as far as I can 
see, is that the opponent is confronted with a statement: you 
(khyod/tvam) maintain / assert / hold a completely ridiculous and 
untenable view! The mark of exclamation is the final ko. It is 
important to note, however, that—again, as far as I have seen—this 
construction seems to appear only in this particular text, something 
which, if correct, certainly requires explanation.  
The formula noted by Saitō is of interest to us from a grammatical 
point of view among other things for the fact that ko/go directly 
follows a verb, rather than a pronoun or case particle, for instance, 
thus broadening the range of application of this ‘emphatic’ 
grammatical morpheme. In addition to the examples collected above 
by previous scholars, however, who were almost exclusively interes-
ted in ko/go alone, focusing on the formula verb + na go I have been 
able to locate a number of examples of what seems to me to be a 
previously unnoticed pattern. Numerically speaking most examples 
                                                            
25 Saitō 1984: 196; 2013: 1178; D 223b5–6; P 253a4, ad MMK XIV.8. 
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are in verse, but some appear in prose as well.  
Our first example is found in the Prajñādaṇḍa (Hahn 2011: verse 
201):  
 
[19] sbyin dang spyod pas stong pa yi ||  
nor des nor bdag yin na go ||  
nor de nyid kyis bdag kyang ni ||  
nor gyi bdag po cis ma yin || 
 
Hahn translates:26  
 
If it is true that one can be rich through wealth  
that is neither donated nor enjoyed,  
why do we not become extremely rich  
by not donating wealth we do not have?  
 
The Tibetan text may be difficult to fully understand on its own 
terms,27 but we do notice that na go appears to emphasize the 
condition: “If one is a rich person ….” In fact, this seems to be a more 
wide-spread pattern. In the Udānavarga (XIV.7 = Skt. XIV.7ab, 
XIV.6ef; my translation from Tibetan), again, we find: 
 
[20] mkhas pas brtags shing gsungs pa’i tshig ||  
spyod yul ston par byed pa yi || 
chos ’di rnam par shes na go ||  
khyed cag ci phyir byed mi ’gyur ||  
 
paṇḍitābhā parāmṛṣṭā vāg yā gocarabhāṣiṇī |  
yuṣmākaṁ nu kathaṁ na syād imaṁ dharmaṁ vijānatām ||  
 
While words investigated and spoken by a wise person 
are taught as the domain of practice,  
if you [really] know this teaching, 
why don’t you actualize [lit. do] it? 
 
In the Bodhicaryāvatāra VIII.54, we have (Bhattacharya 1960; my 
translation from Tibetan): 
 
                                                            
26 Hahn 2007: 206: “Falls es mögligh wäre, reich zu werden durch Besitz, / den man 
weder durch Genießen / noch durch Geben nutzt, / warum werden wir dann 
nicht durch diesen Reichtum / ebenso Besitzer großen Reichtums?” 
27 Hahn points to the Sanskrit original as: dānopabhogaśūnyena dhanena dhanino yadi 
| bhavāmaḥ kiṁ na tenaiva dhanena dhanino vayam ||. The relation between this 
and the Tibetan, however, is not completely clear to me. 
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[21] bdag ni sha ’di la dga’ zhes ||  
reg dang blta bar ’dod na ko || 
sems med pa yi rang bzhin gyi ||  
sha ni khyod ko ji ltar ’dod || 
 
māṁsapriyo ’ham asyeti draṣṭuṁ spraṣṭuṁ ca vāñchasi | 
acetanaṁ svabhāvena māṁsaṁ tvaṁ katham icchasi || 
 
If, thinking ‘I enjoy this flesh’, 
you [really] desire to touch it and gaze upon it, 
how is it that you can possibly desire flesh,  
which by its nature is free of consciousness? 
 
We notice in this verse the use of ko in d as well, which I have 
understood with the following question word. Here, as in other 
instances, I think that it is likely that the na go after the verb suggests 
something akin to ‘really’, emphasizing the pregnancy of the verbal 
notion. In the present case, this implies that one does not merely 
desire, but deeply and ardently desires. However, this cannot be 
everywhere the case. In the Suvarṇavarṇāvadāna we find:28 
 
[22] bde ba kun dang rnam bral ba ||  
shin tu mi sdug gyur pa ’di || 
dman pa ci tsam mthong na go ||  
sems ldan snying rje cis mi skye || 
 
imam atyantavirasaṁ sarvasaukhyavivarjitaṁ | 
dīnaṁ yācantam ālokya kṛpotpannā na cetasi || 
 
If you merely see this poor one, 
deprived of all happiness,  
in extreme suffering, 
being mindful, how can compassion not arise? 
 
Here it is possible that the notion the translator attempted to convey 
is that mere seeing should be enough to motivate compassion. But 
that idea is conveyed already by ci tsam, I think. The exact force of na 
go, then, remains unclear to me.  
Sometimes it seems that indeed it is, however, the conditionality 
(that is, the force of na, rather than the force of the verbal root) that is 
being emphasized. We have already seen several examples of verb + 
                                                            
28 §89.2; Rajapatirana 1974: 87; Derge Tanjur 4144, ’dul ba, su 209b4–5; my 
translation from Tibetan. 
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na go from the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya. In the Kauśāmbakavastu of 
that same collection, we read:29 
 
[23] tshig mi mthun la phyogs nyams30 yangs ||  
’di gtso min zhes sems byed pa || 
dge ’dun dbye bar ’gyur na go ||  
mthu chung cung zad cis mi bsam || 
 
pṛthakchabdās samajavā nedaṁ śreṣṭham iti manyatāṁ* <|> 
saṁghe hi bhidyamāne hi nābalaṁ kiṁci manyatāṁ* <||> 
 
If, being lenient in the face of disagreement,  
thinking ‘this is not the most import point,’ 
there would be [the danger of] a split in the monastic  
    community 
how could one not consider the matter a mere trifle?  
 
As illustrated above, sometimes a verse appears in several forms, 
only one of which might exhibit the pattern in which we are 
interested. In Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākrama I, we find a citation of the 
Laṅkāvatārasūtra II.175:31  
 
[24] blo yis rnam par gzhigs na go || 
ngo bo nyid ni gzung du med || 
de phyir de dag brjod med cing || 
ngo bo nyid kyang med par bshad || 
 
buddhyā vivecyamānānāṁ svabhāvo nāvadhāryate | 
tasmād anabhilāpyās te niḥsvabhāvāś ca deśitāḥ || 
 
If/when [= whenever?] the mind examines [things], 
                                                            
29 Derge Kanjur 1, ’dul ba ga 128b6, Clarke 2014: 282v5 = Dutt 1939–1959: III/2, 
182.13–14; my translation is from Tibetan; I thank Berthe Jansen for her remarks. 
There are a number of versions of this verse, for instance in the Udānavarga XIV.5; 
see Dietz 1998: 10. The Sanskrit is quite hard to understand in the form found in 
the Vinaya manuscript. At the very least, in the Sanskrit the repetition of hi is not 
good, but a glance at the parallels (cited by Dietz 1998: 10) demonstrates that 
what must have been a locative in °amhi or something similar became °e hi; this 
same observation is offered mutatis mutandis by Bernhard 1965: 208n3. My 
interpretation of this Tibetan text differs from that of Dietz (1998: 10n8): “Having 
distinct words but similar intentions—one should not consider this to be good! 
But when a community is being split, one should not consider anything minor.”  
30 Both Derge and Peking (1030, ’dul ba, nge 124a4) read nyams, but I wonder 
whether the Sanskrit sama° could not suggest mnyam. 
31 Derge Tanjur 3915, dbu ma, ki 30b2; Skt. in Nanjio 1923: 116.9–11; my translation 
from Tibetan. 
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their instrinsic nature is beyond its grasp; 
therefore, we teach that those [things] too, 
being inexpressible, lack instrinsic nature.  
 
In the sūtra itself, however, we find this verse as follows (Derge 
Kanjur 106, mdo sde, ca 101b3): 
 
[24a] blo yis rnam par gzhigs na yang || 
gang phyir rang bzhin mi rig ste || 
de phyir de dag brjod du med || 
ngo bo nyid kyang med par bstan || 
 
When the same verse is quoted elsewhere (Vṛtti ad Madhyamakā-
laṁkāra 61; Ichigō 1985: 174), moreover, we find further variation: 
 
[24b] blo yis rnam par gzhigs na ni || 
ngo bo nyid ni gzung du med || 
de phyir de dag brjod med dang || 
ngo bo nyid kyang med par bshad || 
 
The flexibility we see here exemplifies something of the 
indeterminacy of the application of the formula na go, since obviously 
not all translators or redactors felt the need to deploy it. We do not 
known enough about the fine-grained history of the translation and 
revision of Buddhist works in Tibet to know whether a given 
translator or revisor may have had before him a version with the na 
go formula which he then, perhaps, emended, or whether on the 
contrary the opposite process might have taken place, that is, the 
deployment of na go was felt prefereable in a verse in which it was 
originally not found, or why such a change might have been 
motivated in either direction. However, to be sure, the almost literal 
parallelism between verses such as those cited in [24] suggest—if 
they do not indeed prove—that one or the other of these processes 
must have taken place.  
Returning to the question of ko/go, another verse is found in the 
Catuḥśataka:32 
 
[25] gang gi phyogs ’ga’ rgyu yin zhing || 
phyogs ’ga’ rgyu ma yin des na || 
de ni sna tshogs ’gyur na go ||33 
sna tshogs rtag par mi rigs so || 
                                                            
32 verse IX.12; D 3865 dbu ma, ya 152a7; ed. and trans. Lang 1986: 90–91. 
33 According to Lang (1986: 90n), CD read ko and NP go.  
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An [atom] that has some part which is a cause and some 
part which is not a cause would be, consequently, a 
manifold (citra) [atom]. It is not possible for a manifold 
thing to be permanent.  
 
The editor Lang apparently understood na go to have no special force 
here. However, it may be that we should understand it as 
emphasizing conditionality, and translate something closer to: “If 
[you would maintain that an atom] that has some part (side) which is 
a cause and some part (side) which is not a cause would be, 
consequently, manifold, [we would reply that] it is not reasonable to 
hold that a manifold thing is permanent.”34 
What may be a similar example is found in the Madhyamakā-
laṁkāra, in which verse 31 (ed. and trans. Ichigo 1989: 200–201) reads:  
 
[26] ri mo’i gzhi rnams mthong ba’i tshe || 
de la de bzhin sems mang po || 
ci ste cig ca’i tshul gyis su || 
’byung bar ’gyur bar ’dod na go || 
 
If (the author) agreed (with the opponent, i.e. the Sautrāntika 
who holds) that (many of the same kinds of perceptions) 
occur at the same time, then when you look at a multicolored 
carpet, (there would) occur at the same time as many 
perceptions (as there are colors in the colored carpet).  
 
Here according to Ichigō’s edition (1989: 200n6), in all editions the 
Tanjur version of the verse-only text reads na ko, while the version in 
which the verses are embedded in the commentary spells na go, 
demonstrating once again (as do, for instance, the variants cited by 
Lang for the Catuḥśataka) the apparent near interchangeability of ko 
and go, at least in this sort of environment.  
As a final verse example, in Prajñāvarman’s commentary to 
Udbhaṭasiddhasva ̄min’s Viśes ̣astava (verse 64A; ed. Schneider 1993: 
250), we find him quoting the following:35 
                                                            
34 Vaidya (1923: 136) translated: “Si une partie (d’une chose) devient cause alors 
que l’autre ne le devient pas, alors les deux parties étant différentes elles 
resteront à deux places différentes ; comment la permanence pourrait-elle être 
raisonnable?” 
35 Trans. Schneider 1993: 251: “Wenn man (schon) dadurch im Himmel (wieder-
geboren) wird, / daß man einen Blutsumpf geschaffen hat, / nachdem man 
Opferpfosten errichtet und Vieh getötet hat, / wodurch wird (man dann wohl) in 
der Höller (wiedergeboren)? (So) sprach (er).” 
 What is evidently the Sanskrit original behind this Tibetan is transmitted in 
Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 
	  
326 
[27] mchod sdong btsugs te phyugs bsad nas || 
khrag gi ’dam ni byas gyur pa || 
des kyang mtho ris ’gyur na go || 
dmyal bar gang gis ’gyur ba gsungs || 
 
If even one who cut a sacrificial post, killed cattle, 
and built [a shrine] with the bloody clay 
would go to heaven, 
tell me, then, by what [action] would one go to hell? 
 
To round off our brief survey, it is important to note that the 
construction does appear also in prose, of which we saw one example 
at the outset in the Viṁśikāvṛtti. Other instances, while not common, 
may be found for example in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.36 I refer to the 
following selective examples:37  
                                                                                                                                           
various forms, of which the closest may be that found in the Syādvādamañjarī 65 
of Malliṣena (cited by Bhattacharya 2011: 216): yūpaṁ chitvā paśuṁ hatvā kṛtvā 
rudhirakardamam | yady evaṁ gamyate svarge narake kena gamyate ||. In some 
versions of the Pañcatantra (III.107, cited by Speyer [1896: §223]) we find: vṛkṣāṁś 
chittvā paśūn hatvā kṛtvā rudhirakardamam | yady evaṁ gamyate svargaṁ narakaṁ 
kena gamyate ||. The verse may be familiar to students since it appears also in 
Gonda’s popular Grammar (§XVIII).  
36 It of course also appears elsewhere, and my quotations here too are selective 
(although random!). Just to give a hint, one might notice the Tattvāvatāravṛtti of 
Śrīgupta (D 3892, dbu ma, ha 40b5) where we find [28]: ’on te bden na go || (I 
believe this corresponds to a portion of verse 5 as numbered by Ejima [1980: 
219]). In the Śokavinodana (D 4177, spring yig, nge 33a4) of unknown authorship 
we find [29]: gzhan ni su yang min na go ||. And in the Pramāṇasamuccaya (D 
4203, tshad ma, ce 113a5–6) we have [30]: chos yin par yang ’dod na go ||.  
 It is worth mentioning here that some instances which may at first glance seem 
like they involve the construction verb + na go probably do not. A single example 
may suffice. The Mahāyānapathasādhanavarṇasaṁgraha attributed to Atiśa 
(Sherburne 2000: 458–459, verse 57; Derge Tanjur 3954, dbu ma, khi 302b3; my 
translation) contains the following: 
 
 [31] shin tu bsdus na go mi ’gyur || shin tu spros na gzhung mangs ’gyur || 
 blo dang ldan pas legs dpyad na || go ba’i ched du bdag gis gdams || 
 
 If [my presentation] were extremely condensed, there would be no under-
standing; 
 if I were prolix, the work would become [too] extensive. 
 If an intelligent person were to examine it well, 
 I expound it for the sake of his understanding.  
 
Here the expression is evidently not verb + na go but verb + na + go mi ’gyur, the 
latter a compound verbal expression.  
37 This is repeated also in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (Derge Tanjur 4092, mgon po, 
gu 145a7 = Wogihara 1936: 158.8), as are many of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 
examples; I do not note these citations further. As one example from the 
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 [33]  gal te so so’i skye bo’i skal ba mnyam pa nyid ces bya ba’i rdzas 
zhig yod na go so so’i skye bo nyid kyis ci zhig bya ste | 
 
yadi pṛthagjanasabhāgatā nāma dravyam asti kiṁ punaḥ 
pṛthagjanatvena (Derge Tanjur 4090, mgon po, ku 74a6–7 = 
Pradhan 1975: 67.25). 
 
Here it seems to be a matter of a straight rendering of yadi with gal te 
… na go.  
 
[34]  yang bdag po’i ’bras bu yang med na go ji ltar na ’dus ma byas 
byed rgyu’i rgyu yin zhe na | 
 
athāsaty adhipatiphale katham asaṁskṛtaṁ kāraṇahetuḥ (Derge 
Tanjur 4090, mgon po, ku 93b3 = Pradhan 1975: 91.12–13). 
 
In this case, we have a Sanskrit locative absolute asaty adhipatiphale 
rendered with na go. 
 
[35]  gal te bsam gtan gnyis pa la sogs pa la brten nas nges pa la ’jug na 
go ji ltar te | 
 
atha dvitīyādidhyānasaṁniḥśrayeṇa niyāmāvakrāntau katham 
(Derge Tanjur 4090, mgon po, ku 107a7 = Pradhan 1975: 
108.21). 
 
Here again we have a locative construction niyāmāvakrāntau.38 
 
[36]  gal te yang rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba yan lag bcu gnyis kho 
na yin na de lta na go | ma rig pa’i rgyu ma bstan pa’i phyir 
’khor ba thog ma can du yang ’gyur la | rga shi’i ’bras bu ma 
bstan pa’i phyir mtha’ dang ldan par yang ’gyur ba’am | 
 
yadi khalu dvādaśāṅga eva pratītyasamutpāda evaṁ saty 
avidyāyā anupadiṣṭahetukatvād ādimān saṁsāraḥ prāpnoti 
jarāmaraṇasya cānupadiṣṭaphalatvād antavān (Derge Tanjur 
                                                                                                                                           
Abhidharmakośavyākhyā which does not repeat material from the root text, we 
might cite (Derge Tanjur 4092, mgon po, gu 32b5–6 =Wogihara 1936: 37.7–10) [32]: 
gal te ’du shes yongs su gcod pa’i bdag nyid yin na go de dang mtsungs par ldan na 
mtshan ma la ’dzin pas rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga rnam par rtog pa can du ’gyur ro 
zhe na mi ’gyur te | rnam par shes pa lnga dang mtsungs par ldan pa’i ’du shes ni gsal 
ba ma yin no ||, translating yadi paricchedātmikā saṁjñā tatsaṁprayoge nimittam 
udgṛhṇantīti paṁcāpi vijñānakāyā vikalpakāḥ syuḥ | na syuḥ | na hi paṁcavijñāna-
saṁprayoginī saṁjñā paṭvī |. 
38 Prof. Schmithausen wonders whether here go should not be connected with ji ltar.  
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4090, mgon po, ku 126b2–3 = Pradhan 1975: 134.20–22). 
 
Here we have a yadi construction, which is rendered however with 
plain gal te … na, followed by a locative construction in which evaṁ 
sati is rendered with de lta na go.  
 
[37]  gal te de lta na go ’di la yang de bzhin du lam la snyoms par 
zhugs pas rnam par rig byed ma yin pa med bzhin du gang zhig 
thob pa’i phyir langs na yang log pa’i ngag la sogs pa dag la ni 
mi ’jug la | yang dag pa’i ngag la sogs pa dag la ni ’jug par 
’gyur ba de lta bu’i bsam pa dang lus thob par ’gyur te | 
 
yady evam ihāpy evaṁ kiṁ na gṛhyate mārgasamāpanno vināpy 
avijñaptyā tadrūpam āśayaṁ ca āśrayaṁ ca pratilabhate yasyāḥ 
pratilambhād vyutthito ’pi na punar mithyāvāgādiṣu pravartate 
samyagvāgādiṣu ca pravartate (Derge Tanjur 4090, mgon po, 
ku 171b3–4 = Pradhan 1975: 198.22–23). 
 
In this example we have an apparent combination of these 
constructions, yadi evam being rendered with gal te de lta na go.  
In some of the examples cited in this short survey, na go indicates 
an objection, but the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, for instance, as is typical 
for such polemical works, is full of objections, and only a very few 
examples are marked with the verb + na go construction. In constrast, 
it is worth noting that, to my knowledge, the prasaṅgas which pepper 
Madhyamaka texts—in which an opponent is challenged “if you 
believe ~, then [some unacceptable conclusion must follow]”—are 
never articulated with the verb + na go construction. This absence 
suggests that verb + na go was not—at least for most Tibetan 
translators or translation teams— the construction of choice for a 
strong conditional in which the speaker does not accept the 
condition, despite they way in which we might choose to understand 
a few of our examples. The same might be said, mutatis mutandis, of 
the usage of verb + ko found in Buddhapālita’s work. In other words, 
a broader survey of the overall use of—and failure to make use of—
verb + na go, and more generally speaking the use of ko/go broadly, 
does not allow us to draw general conclusions about the nuance 
intended to be conveyed, despite what isolated examples might—
taken on their own—seem to suggest. Additionally, in this context it 
may not be otiose to note that I have searched for, but failed to find, 
any pattern of usage among Tibetan translators to whom particular 
translations are attributed (and which might then point to regional or 
dialectal usages). Especially when we recall the examples of closely 
parallel verses which, alongside the verb + na go construction, do not 
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deploy it, the question of why such constructions may appear 
remains without a clear answer.  
A final rapid note may be added referring to the pair of 
grammatical morphemes remarked upon by Hahn (1994: 292–293) as 
‘something really new,’ namely ke/ge. He was able to cite just two 
examples from the Jātakamālā of Āryaśūra and one from Harṣadeva’s 
Nāgānanda, in all three cases directly following a verb. According to 
Hahn (1994: 293), “the three examples clearly show that ke/ge is used 
to put emphasis on a question,” but he does not offer any 
comparative speculations with ko/go. Further investigation of 
possible relations between these pairs of morphemes—which at least 
prima facie appear rather similar—remains a task for the future.39  
To sum up, in the central usage we have examined here, go (or ko) 
is significantly found together with na used, with or without gal te, in 
the sense of ‘if’, the force of the go on the whole remaining, however, 
not easy—and indeed, often impossible—to determine. Context 
sometimes suggests that the translators might have wished to 
emphasize the strong provisional nature of a given situation, but this 
is very difficult to tease out, and there are many examples where this 
can hardly be the case. As is so very often the case, we must expect 
only that further research may yield further clues to help unravel the 
remaining obscurities.  
 
 
‘Additional Note’ by Charles Ramble. 
 
As far as I know, ko/go does not exist in Central Tibetan, but it does 
feature in the South Mustang Tibetan (SMT) dialect. In some 
constructions it is more like a definite article than anything else:  
 
[38] yak-go shi-a-nak | ta-go ma-shi-ak; the yak died, [but] the horse 
didn’t die.  
 
With possessive pronouns, however, the go would be closer to 
literary or Central Tibetan ni, or perhaps de ni:  
 
[39]  khö yak-go shi-a-nak | ngi yak-go ma-shi-ak: his yak died, [but] 
                                                            
39 In a perhaps related fashion, Peter Verhagen shares with me the following 
speculation: “in some form or manner this na go particle cluster is related to kho 
na. I am not saying it is a simple inversion without change of semantics and 
function. It seems likely (to me anyway; Hahn has argued the same) that the -ko/-
go particle historically can be traced to the pronoun kho (‘he/she/it’), and this 
pronoun is obviously also the basis for the composite particle / adverb (?) kho na, 
‘only, merely’.” 
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my yak didn’t die. 
 
As for verb + na go, is it possible that there is a difference in affect 
between this and verb + na ni? In Tibetan, the protasis of conditional 
clauses usually ends with na. SMT, however, frequently adds another 
particle after the na: ka or tak, which indicate respectively whether the 
apodosis – the outcome if the condition is fulfilled – would be a good 
or a bad thing. 
 
[40] verb + na ka = the thing that would happen is good 
[41] verb + na tak = the thing that would happen is bad 
 
It seems to me that in all the examples of verb + na go cited above, the 
apodosis either contains a negative of some sort, or, if it does not, 
something bad would have happened (e.g., one would have gone to 
hell). In several examples the na go is followed by a rhetorical 
question, but in these cases I get the impression that expected answer 
to the question is pessimistic or disapproving. 
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